Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2002

American Bush; Jerry Phelps; Brent E. Reid;
Petersen v. City of South Salt Lake : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David M. Carlson; Attorney for Appellee.
W. Andrew McCullough; McCullough & Associates, LLC; Attorneys for Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, American Bush; Jerry Phelps; Brent E. Reid; Petersen v. City of South Salt Lake, No. 20020117.00 (Utah Supreme Court,
2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2101

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
AMERICAN BUSH, a Utah
Corporation; JERRY PHELPS,
d.b.a Paradise Modeling; BRENT
E. REJD, d.b.a. All for Love,
GAYLE PETERSEN, d.b.a. Leather
and Lace,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

(Subject to Assignment to
The Court of Appeals)

vs.
CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE,
A Municipal Corporation,

Case No. 20020117-SC

Defendant and Appellee.

APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, HON. J. DENNIS FREDERICK

Oral Argument & Published Opinion Requested

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, (2170)
MCCULLOUGH & ASSOCIATES, L.L.C.
Attorneys for Appellants
6885 South State Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: (801) 565-0894
DAVID M. CARLSON
Attorney for Appellee
220 East Morris Ave.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone: (801)483-6070

FILED
UTAH SUPREME COURT

SFP 1 9 2G02
PAT BARTHOLOMEW
CLERK OF THE COURT

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
AMERICAN BUSH, a Utah
Corporation; JERRY PHELPS,
d.b.a Paradise Modeling; BRENT
E. REE), d.b.a. All for Love,
GAYLE PETERSEN, d.b.a. Leather
and Lace,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

(Subject to Assignment to
The Court of Appeals)

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE,
A Municipal Corporation,
Defendant and Appellee.

Case No. 20020117-SC
:

APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, HON. J. DENNIS FREDERICK
Oral Argument & Published Opinion Requested
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, (2170)
MCCULLOUGH & ASSOCIATES, L.L.C.
Attorneys for Appellants
6885 South State Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: (801) 565-0894
DAVID M. CARLSON
Attorney for Appellee
220 East Morris Ave.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone: (801)483-6070

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iv

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1

ARGUMENT

2

POINT I:
APPELLEE MISCHARACTERIZES APPELLANTS AS FAVORING "PUBLIC
NUDITY"
2
POINT II:
DEFENDANT'S APPEALS TO "ORIGINAL INTENT' FROM OTHER STATES
FINDS NO SUPPORT IN ITS CITATIONS
6
POINT III:
ALAMEDA BOOKS IS AT LEAST A PARTIAL REPUDIATION OF RENTON,
AND INCREASES THE BURDEN OF THE CITY TO JUSTIFY DIRECT
RESTRICTIONS ON SPEECH AND EXPRESSION
10
POINT IV:
THE ORDINANCE AT ISSUE IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE GENERAL
LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

18

POINT V:
THIS ORDINANCE DOES NOT ENJOY A CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION
OF VALIDITY
19
POINT VI
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT PROPERLY GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST PLAINTIFF REID
20
CONCLUSION

21

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

23

ADDENDUM
A. Letter to South Salt Lake City Council, Dated March 27,2001
ii

CASE AUTHORITY

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
FEDERAL CASES
Boleer v. Youngs Drue Products Corp.. 463 U.S. 60, 71 (n. 20)

19,20

Citv of Cincinnati v. Discovery Networks. Inc..
507 U.S. 410,113 S.Ct. 1792,1800 (1993)

20

Citv of Erie v. Pap's A.M.. 529 U.S. 277 (2000)

2,4,9,10,12,17

Citv of Renton v. Playtime Theatres. Inc.. 475 U.S. 41 (1986)
Doran v. Salem Inn. Inc.. 422 U.S. 922 (1975)

10,17
4

Flanigan's Enterprises. Inc. of Georgia v. Fulton County GA..
242 F.3d 976(11th Cir. 2001) Cert, denied 122 S.Ct. 2556 (2002)
Memoirs v. Massachusetts. 383 U.S. 413 (1966)

13,17
4

Nakatomi Investments. Inc. v. Citv of Schenectady. 949 F.Supp. 988 (N.D.N. Y)

2,9

Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham. 394 U.S. 147,150-1

19

Stanley v. Georgia. 394 U.S. 557 (1969)

5

United States v. Miller. 425 U.S. 435 (1976)

7

United States v. O'Brien. 391 U.S. 367 (1968)

14

STATE CASES
Banberrv Development Corporation v. South Jordan Citv. 631 P.2d 899,904 (Utah 1981)
Citv of Portland v. Tidvman. 759 P.2d 242 (Or. 1988)

19
8,9

People v. MacNamara. 585 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1991)

3

Powell v. State. 510 SE.2d.(GA 1998)

5
iii

Richfield City v. Walker. 790P.2d 87 (Utah App. 1990)
Salt Lake City v. Roberts. 2002 UT 30,443 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (Utah 2002)

18
2,3,8

Schmitt v. State. 590 So.2d 404 (Fla. 1991)

2

State v. CiancaneUi. 181 Or. App.l, 45 P.3d 451 (Or. App. 2002)

5

State v. Henrv. 732 P.2d 9 (Or. 1987)

5

State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990)

6

State v. Lee. 633 P.2d 48 (Utah 1981)

3

State v. Thompson. 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991)

7

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES CITED
§ 76-1-105 U.C.A

3

Utah State Constitution Article XXIV, Section 2

3

ORDINANCES CITED
South Salt Lake City Ordinance § 5.56.310

4,12

IV

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
—000O000—

AMERICAN BUSH, a Utah
Corporation; JERRY PHELPS,
d.b.a Paradise Modeling; BRENT
E. REID, d.b.a. All for Love,
GAYLE PETERSEN, d.b.a. Leather
and Lace

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

(Subject to Assignment to
The Court of Appeals)

CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE, A
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Municipal Corporation

:
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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellants do not espouse "public nudity" and the suggestion to that effect by Defendant is
an attempt to take the attention of the Court off of the very real issues offreeexpression whaich are
presented here. If this ordinance is an attempt to redefine public nudity, it is at odds with State law
and previous rulings of this Court.
Defendant espouses the discredited constitutional doctrine of "original intent" which would
require Courts to restrict individual rights to those recognized in the 17th or 18th centuries. This
Court has previously construed the State Constitution to protect rights which are important to
citizens of today, including the right to befreefromunreasonable interference withfreeexpression.
The ordinance at issue here is not a reasonable or necessary "time, place or manner"
1

restriction; and it is not related to legitimate governmental objectives, such as the suppression of
"negative secondary effects." As a measure directed at censorship, it does not enjoy a presumption
of constitutionality, but the burden remains with the government to justify it.
The claims of Plaintiff Reid were not litigated below and are not ripe for decision here.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

APPELLEE MISCHARACTERIZES APPELLANTS AS FAVORING "PUBLIC NUDITY."

Defendant starts its brief by reviewing a history of "public nudity" under English Common
Law and early American Law. It concludes that public nudity was prohibited by both Common Law
and Early American law, and cited examples of enforcement against those exposing themselves in
public places. Ttait might be relevant if the ordinance at issue was a public nudity law. It is not.
It is specifically designed to apply only to licensed adult entertainment establishments. See §
5.56.310 G. of the South Salt Lake Code, cited at the beginning of both Plaintiffs and Defendants
briefs. This court recently reviewed and applied a "public lewdness" or "public nudity" law in Salt
Lake City v. Keith Roberts, 2002 UT 30, 44 P.3d 767 (Utah 2002). That case did not reach
constitutional issues; but it defined public lewdness or nudity in a manner that applied only when
that conduct was "capable of observance by personsfromthe general community." 2000 UT 30, ^
29. A person, under this Couifs analyses, could still avoid criminal sanctions if he showed that his
expectation of privacy (from the observation from the general community) was reasonable. See
Schmitt v. State, 590 So.2d 404, 410, where the Florida court held that public lewdness requires:
2

. . . an intentional act of sexual indulgence or public indecency, when such causes offense
to one or more persons viewing it or otherwise intrudes upon the rights of others. [The]
terms "lewd" and "lascivious" thus mean something more than a negligent disregard of the
accepted standards of decency, or even an intentional but harmlessly discreet unorthodoxy.
Acts are neither "lewd nor lascivious" unless they substantially intrude upon the rights of
others (internal citations omitted).
This ordinance was not designed to deal with public nudity. The dancing activity at issue
here is not observable by those wh< *

lecifically seek it out and paj an admission chai ge Tlie

ordinance at issue here is thus easily distinguishable from that upheld by that of the United States
Supreme Court in Citvof Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 I IS 2 7: (2000) Plaintiff concedes that public
nudity is not expressive per se, and that all nudity is not entitled to the protection of either Hie 111 liled
States Constitution or that of this State. This ordinance is, like that struck down in Nakatomi
Investments v. City of Schenectady; l.'4'"i" I" ,Mip|t vhh (\ i h IN in I*>l>7) aimed specifically at
expressive nudity in entertainment productions. Further, it is aimed only at the expressive nudity
in certain establishments, and would not include that in "legitimate" theaters or other entertainment
\ eriu.es.
Defendant also states that Utah has traditionally punished sexual conduct both in private and
in public, and quotes a case from 1912 upholding a conviction for fornication. See discussion of
"original intent" in Point II below. This Court had ai, -apiviiaaih in Roberts to takt a p, -..lion
consistent with the one advocated by Defendant here. In that case, the City of Salt Lake argued that
sexual conduct lli.il could be seen by a police officer while lawfully executing his duties (crawling
under a truck) had been criminalized; and the City cited cases, including State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48
(Utah 1981) which minimized the expectation of privacy for Fourth Amendment purposes. This
Court declined Hie ('itv's invitation in infnpnl pultln Irwdiu^ \AW in line wild ii I mirth

Amendment analyses, just as other States have done. See People v. MacNamara, 585 N.E.2d 793
(N.Y. 1991). The State of Utah has not actively prosecuted fornication since 1912. Members of the
legal community and the general public have long since come to assume that private sexual conduct
is protected by an inherent right of privacy, and is "none of the business" of the State or its political
subdivisions. Defendant even goes so far as to suggest that Article XXIV § 2 of the Constitution of
Utah maintains the common law (including nudity prohibitions) in Utah until specifically repealed.
That is not what the Constitution says. It refers only to territorial laws passed by the legislature, and
not common law. Common law crimes were long ago abolished in Utah by the legislature. See §761-105 U.C.A. (1974). Defendant, in its analysis of First Amendment jurisprudence promulgated by
the United States Supreme Court, correctly concludes that the decisions of that court are
"unpredictable and inconsistent." Defendant goes on to say "in the Supreme's Court's nude dancing
cases, the rational for upholding the challenged laws differs from justice to justice, an individual
justices change their rationales from case to case." Plaintiffs would have to agree with that
statement. This has led to impassioned dissents and plurality opinions which cannot logically be
sustained. What is consistent, however, is the repeated assertion by that Court that "nude dancing
of the type at issue here is expressive conduct." Erie v. Pap's A.M.. 529 U.S. at 289. This is
consistent, of course, with the development of modern constitutional law. Freedom of speech and
of the press comes in many forms. While novels that exude sexuality were once "banned in Boston"
it has long become clear that the Constitution of this country protects that sort of expression, even
when it is sexual in nature. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). The Supreme
Court agreed that dance as entertainment was also expressive conduct, deserving protection of the
First Amendment, in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.. 422 U.S. 922 (1975). In that case, the Supreme Court
4

struck down a local ordinance which "would prohibit the performance of the 'Ballet Africains' and
a number of other works o( unquestionable artistic and socially redeeming significance. 422 U.S.
at 933." To avoid the possibility of such censorship, the court found the ordinance vold on its face,
though the specific "bar room" nude dancing involved in the case "may involve only the barest
minimum ot pinkrlcil cx(»it.;ssnni " \j)
It is acknowledged that many of the constitutional protections which have been extended to
individuals by both State and Federal courts have involved incremental advances injudicial ruling,

ago. In its day, the pronouncements of Thomas Jefferson that mankind "are endowed by their creator
with certain inalienable rights" was a very radical concept. It has been certainly since 1912 that the
courts of both this State and the Federal courts have dtlcin in icd (kif uui Sf;tfe and Federal h'lls of
rights do indeed protect the rights of individuals to be free to a substantial extent from government
' siioopnit'" into iiiicii privitR: ailiiirs, Jtisl <is most Utahns would assume that their private sexual
conduct is indeed private, few would argue with the decision of the United States Si iprei ne Court
in Stanley v. Georgia. 394 U.S. 557 (1969) that private viewing of even "pornographic" materials
is outsid'"1 <^' i It "tmut*' goientntent mini si

11 ioo» ulic Stale of Georgia many more years to

officially pronounce that sexual activity between consenting adults, in private, is indeed private. See
Powell v. State, 510 SE.2d 18 (u A J 998), i iven without such a clear pronouncement by this court,
Utahns have long since become secure in the knowledge th^
simply does not occur in this state.

/

POINT II
DEFENDANT'S APPEALS TO "ORIGINAL INTENT' FROM OTHER STATES FINDS NO
SUPPORT IN ITS CITATIONS.
Plaintiffs, in their main brief, cited several instances of state courts, including this Court,
which have diverged from federal interpretations of the Bill of Rights. Defendant expresses much
satisfaction over a recent Oregon Court of Appeals decision in State v. Ciancanelli. 181 Or. App. 1,
45 P.3d 451 (Or. App. 2002). In that case, the Oregon Court of Appeals seems to divergefromthe
decisions of the Oregon Supreme Court regarding public sexual expressions. In that case, the
Defendant was charged with presenting a live sex show for an audience. Defendant contended that
he was able to do so under State v. Henry. While acknowledging Henry as the prevailing Supreme
Court opinion, the Court of Appeals found:
In short, however quaint it may seem to us a century and a half later, the historical record
establishes beyond peradventure that the framers of the Oregon Constitution did not
understand Article I, section 8, to provide protection against state regulation of public sexual
intercourse and masturbation. To the contrary, the notion that the state or federal constitution
protected public sexual conduct was unknown until well into the twentieth century. We
therefore conclude that the regulation of that same conduct under ORS 167.062 is wholly
contained within a well-established historical exception. 45 P.3d at 460.
Obviously, the expressive conduct which the Plaintiffs have been licensed to provide for
many years in South Salt Lake has little in common with the live sex show at issue in this case. The
majority opinion in the Oregon Court of Appeals, however, is based on a historical analysis of the
Oregon Constitution that has been soundly rejected by the Oregon Supreme Court. This Court has
often acknowledged the Utah Constitution as a living document. Our State Constitution prohibits,
among other things, "unreasonable searches and seizures." In State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah
1990) this Court said:
6

An increasing number of state courts are relying on an analysis of the search and seizure
provisions of their own constitutions to expand or maintain constitutional protection beyond
the scope mandated by the Fourth Amendment 794 P,2d at 465.
The court went on to say:
The time has come for this court, in applying an automobile exception to the warrant
requirement of article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution to try to simplify, if possible, the
search and seizure rules so that they can be more easily followed by the police and the courts
and, at the same time, provide the public with consistent and predictable protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures. This can be accomplished buy eliminating some of the
confusing exceptions to the warrant requirement that have been developed by federal law in
recent years. 794 P.2d at 469.
This Court has alwnvs assuniai Mini (In prnlu doth of llir SiLilc i uiishliilniri ."Jin II mm
parallel to those of the United States Constitution, are at least equal to those of the U.S. Constitution.
W hen, however, this Court determines that the protection of individual liberty contained in the
Federal Constitution, and enunciated by the federal courts, is not adequa

e

State Constitution to defend those freedoms. Building on Larocco, this court, in State v. Thompson.
8 •*

J'M l o p j i H l a l sl<il<: coii'.litiiiilioiwl p i o k t IIOJLS lurllu-

. equestion there w a s

whether the State, in a criminal proceeding, could validly subpoena bank records. That question had
been answered in the affirmative by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Miller. 425
US 435 (1976) where 1 h< ; Coui t said:
The checks are not confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be used in
commercial transactions. All of the documents obtained, including financial statements and
deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to
their employees in the ordinary course of business. 425 US at 442.
This Court first noted that several other state courts had found additional protection in their
stale GoMtliliilioii», ami tlit'ii sdiU A

.:

We hold that under article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution, defendants under the facts
of this case had a right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures of their bank
7

statements, "checks, savings, bonds, loan applications, loan guarantees, and all papers which
[they] supplied to the bank to facilitate the conduct of [their] financial affaires upon the
reasonable assumption that the information would remain confidential." (Quoting decisions
from Pennsylvania and California) 810 P.2d at 418
In neither of these decisions did this Court resort to minutes of the Constitutional Convention
held in the 1800fs. In neither case did this Court wonder aloud about the specific intentions
regarding bank documents of the founding fathers in 1789, or their successors in 1896. The
constitution of Utah required this Court to protect its citizens against the "unreasonable" actions of
the State in their fervor to root out crime. It is perfectly valid and constitutionally sound for this
Court to decide that the Federal courts have not been zealous enough in protecting citizens against
the prying eyes of the state. Likewise, in State v. Roberts, supra. Salt Lake City made the argument
that it is reasonable, and within the language of the law, to give its police officers the right to peep
in windows, crawl under trucks and otherwise invasively intrude on the private conduct of its
citizens. This Court declined to give them that authority. Defendant has argued over and over that
the conduct complained of is public in nature and open for all to see. It is that public nature, we are
told, that gives the City and the State the right to step in and prohibit it. This court has previously
rejected such entreaties and should do so again now.
The Oregon Supreme Court, in City of Portland v. Tidvman. 759 P.2d 242 (Or. 1988)
specifically rejected interference with expression in an effort to deal with "secondary effects." The
ordinance at issue in Tidvman recited the usual allegations of lowered property values, higher crime,
and other "secondary effects" associated with adult businesses, and then proceeded to zone such
businesses into a small and closely regulated portion of the City. The Oregon Supreme Court stated:
In short, the problem with the city's asserted "concern with the effect of speech," is that the
operative text of the ordinance does not specify adverse effects that constitute the "nuisance"
8

attributable to the sale of "adult" materials and therefore does not apply only when these
adverse effects are shown to occur or imminently threaten to occur. Rather, the ordinance
makes a one-time legislative determination that retailing substantial quantities of sexually
oriented pictures and words within the proscribed area will have adverse effects that retailing
other pictures and words would not have, and that it therefore can be restricted as a
"nuisance" by a law describing the materials rather than the effects. By omitting the
supposed adverse effects as an element in the regulatory standard, the ordinance appears to
consider the "nuisance" to be the characteristics of the " adult" materials rather than
secondary characteristics and anticipated effects of the store. Such law making is what
Article I, section 8 forbids. 789 P.2d at 248.
There is no legal basis to suggest that the Oregon Court of Appeals, an inferior court, has
overruled these clear pronouncements of the Oregon Supreme Court. In fact, constitutional
amendments specifically seeking to overturn Tidvman have been twice proposed by the Oregon
legislature. Most recently in the 2000 general election, the people of Oregon refused to accede to
such a change. Plaintiffs agree with Defendant that the pronouncements of the United States
Supreme Court in this area have not always been well reasoned, consistent, or sufficient, to even a
majority of the justices. Plaintiffs contend, however, that the logic of the Oregon Court in this case
is most persuasive. Secondary effects, if they exist, can be directly addressed by any number of
valid uses of the police power, without suppressing the expression itself. See dissent of Justice
Stephens in City of Erie in which he stated:
In what can most delicately be characterized as an enormous understatement, the plurality
concedes that "requiring dancers to wear pasties and G-strings may not greatly reduce these
secondary effects." Ante, at 301. To believe that the mandatory addition of pasties and a Gstring will have any kind of noticeable impact on secondary effects requires nothing short
of a titanic surrender to the implausible. 529 U.S. at 323.
Plaintiffs acknowledge that following the logic of Tidvman an Nakatomi may subject this
9

court to some criticism. South Salt Lake politicians, however, have their own agenda and priorities.
Certainly "Community Defense Counsel" the Arizona group which assisted in drafting this
ordinance, has theirs (See www.communitydefense.org). They are not the same as those of this
Court, which is given the duty to protect its citizens against the excesses of the government, even
when that is not a popular thing to do.
POINT III
ALAMEDA BOOKS IS AT LEAST A PARTIAL REPUDIATION OF RENTON, AND
INCREASES THE BURDEN OF THE CITY TO JUSTIFY DIRECT RESTRICTIONS ON
SPEECH AND EXPRESSION.
Defendant contends that Alameda Books is a reaffirmation of Renton; and that the City's
ordinance should be upheld if based on any evidence "reasonably believed to be relevant." The City
goes on to state that Alameda Books involved a "unique" situation, and that it is thus "of
questionable relevance to the issues in this case." It then makes a tremendous leap and states
"Plaintiffs therefore cannot cast direct doubt on the City's legislative record any more than they can
successfully contend against U.S. Supreme Court cases that are in point."(Appellee Br. p.31). That
statement is made after the explanation as to why U.S. Supreme Court decisions which might
support Plaintiffs" position should be disregarded by this court. The legal conclusions reached by
the City in this regard are without foundation. The U.S. Supreme court has not prohibited a party
from "cast[ing] direct doubt on the City's legislative record." Plaintiffs referred extensively to City
ofErie in their previous brief, including the notation that the Erie ordinance "is on its face a general
prohibition on public nudity."(Aplt. Br. p. 12). Plaintiffs pointed out (Aplt. Br. p. 28-29) that the
Supreme Court had referred to the opportunities the Plaintiffs had "to contest the council's findings
about secondary effects — before the council itself, throughout the state proceedings, and before this
10

Court." At least as far as the prohibition of nudity is concerned, the exception to Renton started with
City of Erie, not with Alameda Books. Plaintiffs have,fromthe beginning, attempted to contest the
council's findings about secondary effects. In doing so, they submitted substantial material to the
South Salt Lake City Council for review. The City filed affidavits before the trial court, by the
mayor and members of the City Council, as to the "opportunity to review and be familiar with the
volume of materials provided by the city staff." (R. 207-220). A reference to some of that material
is included in a section designated as "Purpose and Findings" at the beginning of the subject
ordinance. Defendant's brief refers to thosefindingsas sufficient to present a legislative record in
support of the ordinance. That argument was accepted by the trial court in its memorandum decision
where the Court said "additionally, the legislative record of the ordinance establishes that the South
Salt Lake City Council did more than rely on secondary effects studiesfromother cities." (R. 481).
That statement is backed up by a footnote:
In this regard, it is undisputed the evidence was presented to the Council members prior to
their decision on the issue. Consequently, although the council member's [sic] specific
thoughts may never be known, claims that this is critical to a determination of the
reasonableness of their decision is without merit. Id.
That statement is particularly curious, because it does not state what additional evidence
beyond "secondary effects studiesfromother cities" may have been considered; and then it appears
to state that it isn't important anyway.
Among the "secondary effects studiesfromother cities" and not mentioned in the "findings"
section of the ordinance is a detailed studyfromthe City of Atlanta which no correlation between
nudity and secondary effects. The official Fulton County study, dated in 1997 and containing more
than 500 pages of support, was submitted to the City Council by Plaintiffs. See discussion below

11

of Flanigan's Enterprises. So was a new study from Fort Wayne, Indiana, and conducted by Dr.
Dan Linz, a professor of Communication and Law and Society at the University of California, Santa
Barbara. Dr. Linz submitted additional written testimony and scholarly articles, including
"Debunking the Legal Myth of Negative Secondary Effects", published in the Journal of
Communication Law and Policy in 2001 (R. 219-222). Dr. Linz indicated his willingness to testify
personally before the City Council, and is an anticipated witness in any trial of this matter on the
merits. Defendants attempt to buttress their basically non-existent "legislative record" by referring
specifically to the "Purpose and Findings" portion of the ordinance, including 25 specific findings
(Appellee Br. p. 28). Plaintiffs, through counsel, rebutted those "Findings" in detail in a letter
submitted to the City Council, dated March 27, 2001, about a month before the ordinance was
passed. A copy of that letter is included as an Addendum to this brief. No response was ever made.
No reference was made by the City in any of its materials to this evidence, with the exception of it
being included in a list of materials submitted, attached to the affidavit of Councilman Bill
Anderson. It is unknown whether it was brought to the attention of, or considered by, any member
of the City Council. Plaintiffs believe that, were this material read or considered, it would make it
"less reasonable" to believe the poorly written, poorly researched, and scientifically unsound
materials provided by out-of-state special interests. It is a question of fact whether the City Council
"reasonably believed" that they were fighting secondary effects in a manner reasonably calculated
to actually reduce these effects. And Plaintiffs have a right to present facts disputing these
allegations.
While Plaintiffs were at least able to proffer their material (ignored though it was) to the City
Council, they were unable to put on direct any evidence before the District Court. The District Court
12

did review the affidavits of Plaintiffs and was aware of the material allegedly "considered" by the
City Council. The District Court refused to consider any of this material as relevant to its decision.
Plaintiffs, in their own Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, asked the court to reserve for trial
"whether the Constitutional rights of Plaintiffs are overridden by a legitimate, reasonable, and
necessary assault on negative secondary effects." (R. 465). Plaintiffs also pointed out the total lack
of record of debate in the City Council, and the lack of reference in any manner (other than the
"canned" preamble provided the city by Mr. Bergthold's special interest lawfirm)to concerns over
secondary effects in the city. The contradictory information provided by Plaintiffs, and their expert
testimony, is indeed relevant to the question of the validity of this ordinance. See Opinion of Justice
Souter, concurring in part and dissenting in part in City of Erie:
The proposition that the presence of nude dancing establishments increases the incidence of
prostitution and violence is amenable to empirical treatment, and the city councilors who
enacted Erie's ordinance are in a position to look to the facts of their own community's
experience as well as to experience's elsewhere. Their failure to do so is made all the clearer
by one of the amicus briefs, largely devoted to the argument that scientifically sound studies
show no such correlation. See Brief for First Amendment Lawyers Association as Amicus
Curiae 16-23, Id At App. 1-29. Footnote 3, 529 U.S. at 314-5.
Perhaps the first successful use of the "opportunity to contest the councilsfindingsabout
secondary effects" occurred in Flanigan's Enterprises. Inc. of Georgia v. Fulton County GA.. 242
F.3d 976 (11th Cir. 2001) Cert, denied 122 S.Ct. 2556 (2002). In that case, the Fulton County Board
of Commissioners (Atlanta, Ga.) ordered the Fulton County Police Department, the County Attorney
and the Department of Economic Development "to conduct a study on the secondary effects of
alcohol consumption in adult entertainment establishments located in Fulton County." The staffwas
also ordered to assemble studiesfromother jurisdictions, similar to those used in the "findings" of
South Salt Lake. According to the Court:
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The resolution further stated the Board's intent "to enact, if wanted by said studies, a
"carefully tailored regulation to minimize the negative secondary effects of the serving and
consumption of alcoholic beverages at adult entertainment establishments...."
The study concluded that, for the time period Jan. 1,1995 through May 31,1997, there was
no statistical correlation showing an increase in crime at adult entertainment establishments
that served alcoholic beverages. Rather, the statistics indicated greater instances of calls for
service and reported crime at non-adult entertainment establishments that served alcoholic
beverages. 242 F.3d at 979.
As a check on the government study, several adult entertainment establishments conducted
their own study of the economic impact they had on surrounding property. Once again, according
to the court "the study revealed high occupancy and rental rates in existing buildings, expensive
improvements, business expansions, turn away business volume and proposed development in the
clubs' vicinities." Id
In further response, the Board of Commissioners hired its own appraiser to review the studies
provided by the clubs. Once again, the results were disappointing for the City: "Based on the
marked data provided by LDA, Inc., Dabney found that the Clubs has caused no diminution of
property values or rents." Id at 980.

Nevertheless, the City persisted and held two public

meetings on November 19 and December 17 of 1997, resulting in a new ordinance with a preamble
amazingly similar to that of South Salt Lake:
WHEREAS, based on the experience of other urban counties and municipalities, which
experiences the Board of Commissioners finds are relevant to the problems faced by Fulton
County, Georgia, and which do not very greatly among generally comparable communities
within this country, the Boards of Commissioners finds that public nudity, under certain
circumstances, particularly circumstances related to the sale and consumption of alcoholic
beverages in adult entertainment facilities offering live entertainment, begets criminal
behavior and tends to create undesirable community conditions;
WHEREAS, the limitation of nude conduct in establishments licensed to sell alcohol for
consumption on the premises is in the public welfare, and is a matter of government interest
and concern to prevent the occurrence of criminal behavior and undesirable community
14

conditions normally associated with establishments which serve alcohol and also allow or
encourage nudity. IdL at 980-1.
The City went on, in its new ordinance, to prohibit nudity in adult establishments involving
the sale of alcohol. The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the decision of the District Court:
The district court concluded that Section 18-76 was constitutional as a matter of law because,
like the ordinance in Sammy's Section 18-76 was amended to prevent negative secondary
effects related to nude dancing, and therefor, furthered a substantial government interest
unrelated to free expression. The court reasoned that the experiences of other urban areas
provided the requisite factual basis for the Board's state justification that nude dancing
begets criminal behavior and tends to create undesirable community conditions. Moreover,
the district court rejected Plaintiffs' arguments that the Board, in face of contradictory local
studies, unreasonably relied on outdated and foreign studies that focused on the location of
adult entertainment businesses rather than the relationship between alcohol and live nude
entertainment. Id at 981-2.
The Eleventh Circuit reviewing the ordinance under the O'Brien intermediate scrutiny test,
accepted at face value the City's declaration that the ordinance was intended to target negative
secondary effects. It accepted the ordinance on its face as satisfactory of the third and fourth prongs
of the test. The problem, the court found, was with the second prong of the test which requires that
the ordinance furthers a substantial interest within the power of the government. Regarding this
prong, the Court said:
In order to meet their burden under this element, the Defendants must have "some factual
basis for the claim that [adult] entertainment in establishments serving alcoholic beverages
results in increased criminal activity" and other undesirable community conditions. Id at
985.
The court went on to state: "our own cases demonstrate that we require some reasonable
justification for legislation which suppresses, albeit incidently, protected expression." Id. And it
further stated:
Unlike in Pap's and Sammy's, where the plaintiffs never challenged the cities' findings, the
Fulton County Clubs challenged and disproved the Board's finding. The evidence in the
15

record relating to conditions in Fulton County shows unequivocally that property values in
neighborhoods adjoining the clubs have increased during the time the Clubs have been in
existence, and that surrounding buildings show no signs of blight or lack of physical
maintenance. Moreover, the Fulton County police study found greater reported crime
connected with establishments that served alcohol but did not feature adult entertainment.
In other words, local studies commissioned by both the Clubs and the Board found no
evidence of the secondary effects with which the Board was purportedly concerned. The
question thus becomes, was it reasonable for Defendants to ignore relevant local studies and
rely instead upon remote foreign studies in determining whether adverse secondary effects
were attributable to the Fulton County Clubs?
We do not think that Defendants had any reasonable justification for amending Section 18-76
when the county's own studies negated the very interests it purportedly sought to prevent.
The case might be different were the Clubs a recent addition to Fulton County
neighborhoods. It is undisputed, however, that Plaintiffs have continually operated these
adult entertainment establishments for nearly a decade. Id. at 986.
It is indeed relevant that Plaintiffs have operated their clubs in South Salt Lake for many
years. The record of their problems, or lack thereof, is not hard to obtain; and Plaintiffs have offered
to show their effect on the community, in an evidentiary hearing,fromthe time this action was first
filed. The Affidavits of Hal Cannon (R. 142-155), Jerry Nielsen (R. 349-357), and Gayle Petersen
(R. 358-368) are sufficient to overcome summary judgment. The affidavits squarely address the
questions of secondary effects and put them at issue. Plaintiffs state they have not been convicted
of any "SOB violations" for many years. They allude to the fact that they have long been required
to post bonds for any civil penalties associated with their businesses, and state there have been no
attempts to use those bonds. Hal Cannon, the CEO of American Bush is the record owner of the
building in which the business is housed, as is Gayle Petersen. Their affidavits claim that the y have
spent considerable sums of money upgrading their buildings, and that they add to, rather than detract
from, their neighborhood. Mr. Cannon specifically stated under oath that his building valuation
had increased from $258,000 to $434,000 in thefiveyears previous to his affidavit. Plaintiffs also
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allege in their affidavits, that the ordinance is not designed to further regulate their businesses, but
to shut them down. The action of the City in cutting the number of alcoholic beverage licenses, at
the same time as this ordinance was passed (R. 255-261) is more than a coincidence, and raises
additional factual issues.

If anything, the decision in Alameda Books moves towards the

adoption of the position of the Eleventh Circuit that the findings of the city are subject to rebuttal
by the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs in this case did submit material to the City Council tending to negate the
information receivedfromMr. Bergthold's organization. Whether the City ignored it by failing to
read it, or read it and then ignored it is not as important as the fact that it was clearly not taken into
account. These Plaintiffs have not, in any sense, waived the right to produce evidence on whether
the City's attack on secondary effect is reasonable under the circumstances. They have proclaimed
their willingness to provide this evidence to the city and to the trial court, at every opportunity. See
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, (R. 51-76), Plaintiffs' Reply
Memorandum (R.264-282) and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 404-440). Renton
may be read by some to justify the view that the City is reasonably attacking its urban problems if
it says it is. This position has been eroded by City of Erie, Flanigan's. and now by Alameda Books.
at least as it relates to the absolute prohibition of nude dancing. Defendant's brief maintains that this
ordinance is not an absolute prohibition, but the same kind of "time, place and manner restriction"
as in Renton. But see again the dissent of Justice Stephens in City of Erie:
The plurality relies on the so-called "secondary effects" test to defend the ordinance. Ante
at 290-296. The present use of that rationale, however, finds no support whatsoever in our
precedents. Never before have we approved the use of that doctrine to justify a total ban on
protected First Amendment expression. On the contrary, we have been quite clear that the
doctrine would not support that end. (529 U.S. at 318).
The Supreme Court did not simply reverse the Summary Judgment rendered by the Ninth Circuit,
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but remanded the case for a trial on the contested and relevant issues of fact. Plaintiffs in this
instance deserve that same opportunity.
POINT IV
THE ORDINANCE AT ISSUE IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE GENERAL LAWS OF THE
STATE OF UTAH.
Defendant suggests that Plaintiffs argument on this point is "opaque." One wonders if it
would be more suitable to counsel if it were "transparent." Nevertheless, whether Defendant's
counsel is confused or not, the argument is fairly simple. For most of its brief, Defendant claims that
this is an issue of "public nudity." That term appears over and over in Appellee's brief. Plaintiff
merely points out that public nudity has been defined by the state of Utah, and that the definition
appears to apply only to nudity where unsuspecting passers-by might see, and be offended by it. In
the Roberts case referred to previously, this court construed Salt Lake City's public lewdness
ordinance consistent with the state wide public policy. The City had argued the Salt Lake City
police had the right to ferret out nudity where ever it could be found, so long as the police were
lawfully in a place of observation. The South Salt Lake ordinance seems to , at one point, be an
attempt to become a public nudity ordinance, when it attempts to redefine "place open to public
view" in contradiction to this Court's ruling in Roberts. It never relies on that definition again; but
the impression that the ordinance is dealing with "public nudity" certainly has stuck in the mind of
the City's counsel. In Point VI of the brief, however, the City seems to be switching its position.
The City now seems ready to deny that it is a public nudity ordinance and claim that it is a licensing
ordinance. Perhaps it can be both; but the City seems to try and make its ordinance a moving target,
by denying it is whatever Plaintiffs claim it is. If the State of Utah, in its public lewdness law, has
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set the parameters of what a public place, or "a place open to public view" may be, a contrary
definition in a South Salt Lake ordinance would clearly be in conflict. The City cites Richfield City
V. Walker, 790 P.2d 87,90 (Utah App. 1990) for the proposition that a " municipal ordinance need
not be identical to the controlling state statute to be consistent with it." The point seems to be
obvious here, however, that the ordinance, if it is a public nudity law, is not consistent with state law
which defines a public place very much differently. Terms which are defined by state law (whether
within the statute itself or by court interpretation of it) must have uniform meanings throughout the
State. The term "open to public view" has been defined by Salt Lake City and this Court, to mean
something specific, comprehensible, and consistent with State law. South Salt Lake cannot redefine
the term to mean something that it does not mean in the rest of the State. If the City has chosen to
do this, its action is void.
POINT V
THIS ORDINANCE DOSE NOT ENJOY A CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF
VALIDITY.
The City argues that there is a strong presumption of constitutionality which applies to this
ordinance, and cites State v. Packer, 77 UT 500,297 P. 1013 (1931). The City claims that Plaintiffs'
authority to the contrary is based on a single U.S. District Court case. This Court has indeed ruled,
more recently than Packer, that there is a presumption of constitutionality "incident to a
municipality's exercise of its legislative powers." See Banberrv Development Corporation v. South
Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899, 904 (Utah 1981). Efforts, however, to censor protected expression do
not enjoy such a constitutional presumption. In Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 US 147,150-1,
the Court dealt with a City ordinance requiring a permit for a parade or demonstration. The court
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said:
This ordinance as it was written, therefore, fell squarely within the ambit of the many
decisions of this Court over the last 30 years, holding that a law subjecting the exercise of
First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and
definite standards to guide the licensing authority, is unconstitutional. "It is settled by a long
line of recent decisions of this Court that an ordinance which, like this one, makes the
peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the
uncontrolled will of an official - as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted
or withheld in the discretion of such official - is an unconstitutional censorship or prior
restraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms. Staub v. Baxlev. 355 U.S. 313, 322. And
our decisions have made it clear that a person faced with such an unconstitutional licensing
law may ignore it and engage with impunity in the exercise of the right of free expression
for which the law purports to require a license. "The Constitution can hardly be thought to
deny to one subjected to the restrains of such an ordinance the right to attack it's
constitutionality, because he has not yielded to it's demands." Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S.
584, 602 (Stone, C.J., dissenting), adopted per curiam on rehearing, 319 U.S. 103,104.
When a city deals in the realm of censorship, the court makes no such assumption that the
law is constitutional. As the United States Supreme Court said in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 (n. 20): "The Party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial speech
carries the burden of justifying it." See also City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Networks. Inc., 507
U.S. 410 (1993.) A summary judgment is to be reviewed "in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Plaintiffs have certainly overcome the summary judgment. Like the City in
Alameda Books. Plaintiff should be granted their day in court, and the opportunity to present facts
sufficient to challenge the constitutionality of this law.
POINT VI
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT PROPERLY GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST
PLAINTIFF REID.
Defendant argues in it s brief that the City asked "for a summary judgment, denying all Plaintiffs'
claims and causes of action." The City goes on to state "it was incumbent upon counsel to respond
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in full to the City's motion." The City's motion, however, never mentioned either Plaintiff Reid or
the sections of the ordinance which were in dispute between the City and that Plaintiff. The City
goes on, in a footnote, to state "there appears to be no argument to be made on behalf of Appellant
Reid, as it is undisputed that the City has not applied the Ordinance to him or his business." (R. 507)
(Appellee Br. at 46). That is exactly the point. Because the city has not applied the ordinance to
Appellant Reid, there was no need to argue the case as to him; and nobody did. Plaintiff Reid only
asked for his cause of action to be dismissed without prejudice, so that it can be brought again if the
City changes its mind and attempts to enforce it against him. Because the issues have not been
litigated, dismissal with prejudice would prevent him from ever having the right to attack the
ordinance; and that is a denial of due process.
In a second footnote, the city suggest that "substantial or significant portion" is a "term of
art" which has been "validated" in other cases. This is not the place to argue the merits of Plaintiff
Reid's case, as no such arguments were made below. It should be pointed out, however, that a
similar ordinance is at issue in the pending case of Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom. Case No.
20010794-SC. That matter has been set for oral arguments on October 2,2002. That is the proper
forum for that case to be argued, and a decision may well have some effect on Mr. Reid. That issue
should await the case in which it is properly briefed and argued. In that matter, the ordinance was
attacked both facially and "as applied" and was tried before the district court for two days, something
that was denied to these Plaintiffs on all of their claims.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs are entitled to a trial on the merits to determine whether the ordinance is a valid
regulation of expressive activity. Plaintiffs are fully prepared to meet their burden upon remand.
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The cause of action brought by Plaintiff Reid, however, should be remanded for the limited
purpose of dismissal without prejudice.
DATED this

f(j day of September, 2002.

MCCULLOUGH & ASSOCIATES, L.L.C.

W. Andrew McCullough
Attorney for appellants
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March 27, 2001
South Salt Lake City Council
220 East Morris Ave.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Ladies and Gentlemen:
This is further correspondence regarding the draft ordinance
amending Chapter 5.56 of the South Salt Lake Municipal Code
pertaining to sexually oriented businesses.
The draft I am
referring to in this correspondence is the most recent one I have,
dated March 12, 2001. I refer herein specifically to the preamble
to the ordinance and Section I "Purpose and Findings". In making
my comments, I note that Leather and Lace has been in business in
South Salt Lake for approximately fifteen years; Paradise Modeling
has been in business in South Salt Lake for approximately twelve
years; and American Bush has been in business in South Salt Lake
for ten years.
Your draft ordinance starts out with a finding "that sexually
oriented businesses are frequently used for unlawful sexual
activities, including prostitution and sexual liaison of a casual
nature". The term "sexually oriented businesses" (SOB's) is used
here to cover a number of different kinds of businesses, most of
which do not operate in South Salt Lake. The only SOB's in South
Salt Lake sit this point are my three clients, featuring nude
dancing, and seminude dancing bars. Your City Attorney has been
kind enough to provide me with records of all police calls around
my clients' businesses for the last five years. None of them have
involved "sexual activities, including prostitution". The City
claims to have relied on "studies" provided by other cities. It
seems that the most accurate information should be coming directly

from your own City. It is difficult to say what kind of businesses
might be "used for unlawful sexual activities", but the businesses
run by my clients are not. To suggest otherwise is fraudulent.
The next paragraph of your preamble states the "the concern
over sexually transmitted diseases is a legitimate health concern
of the City".
It suggests "reasonable regulation of sexually
oriented businesses". For years, my clients have been required to
obtain health exams twice a year to determine if they are carrying
any sexually transmitted diseases. To the best of my knowledge, no
employee has ever tested positive. Certainly there have been no
complaints that a sexually transmitted disease was transmitted as
the result of contact with any of our entertainers. Such contact,
of course, is prohibited
(as will be discussed later).
Acknowledging that this is not a problem, the draft ordinance
deletes the requirement for these STD tests. On the one hand, you
are claiming that stricter regulation is necessary to prevent
disease; and on the other hand, you are saying that the tests are
no longer necessary, because they have never yet proved positive.
Suggesting both of those things in one ordinance is not only
inconsistent, it is intellectually dishonest.
Next, your preamble suggests that my clients, because of their
very nature, "have a deleterious effect on both the existing
businesses around them and residential areas of the City adjacent
to them, causing increased crime and the downgrading of property
values". I am working on obtaining tax assessments for all of my
clients, and the surrounding businesses. I will note that Paradise
(2285 South Main Street) is surrounded by new businesses, including
a large new car lot. The suggestion that my client has created a
blighted area in that neighborhood is preposterous. American Bush
has provided me with tax assessments from 1996 through the present.
They are as follows: 1996, $258,100.00; 1997, $362,400.00; 1998,
$362,400.00; 1999, 362,400.00; 2000, 434,500.00. The value of my
clients' property has not quite doubled in five years.
The
deleterious effect on the neighborhood seems to have escaped the
assessor. I fully expect that businesses in the same neighborhood
have had similar increases in value.
There is certainly no
suggestion that I have heard, that any of my clients have created,
or contributed to, any of the conditions generally referred to as
"urban blight". In fact, because they are zoned into areas away
from homes, they clearly have contributed to the resurgence of
areas otherwise consigned to warehouses and other unattractive land
uses.
Over the years, the City Council has tinkered with the SOB
Ordinance, making it more restrictive, and making sure that the

activities in the businesses are well regulated. Entertainers on
stage must stay three feet away from their customers. All rooms in
which entertainers and customers may otherwise be alone together,
are monitored by video camera. Monitoring stations are open to the
police at any time; and they have been regularly monitored by South
Salt Lake vice officers over the years. There are barriers between
the client and the customer which prevent any unlawful contact; and
there are no known instances of any sexual contact between
customers and entertainers in the years that these businesses have
been there.
A few years ago, one of your vice officers complained to
American Bush that he was afraid he could be seen coming in the
front door, and that any inappropriate activity would cease before
he could see it. In response, my clients gave him a key to the back
door where he could come in unobserved any time; and they also gave
him the alarm code, allowing him to bypass any warning signal.
Your preamble is followed by a number of "findings", none of
which have any relevance whatsoever to what has gone on over the
last ten years in South Salt Lake. To avoid unnecessary length, I
will respond to each of the 25 findings, by number, as they are
contained on pages 3-7 of your proposed ordinance:
1. The present ordinance contains substantial mechanisms to
make owners of establishments responsible for activities which
occur on their premises, including bonds which can be forfeited for
unlawful activities. In the last fifteen years, no action has*been
taken against any bond.
2. All information in South Salt Lake is that there are no
"higher incidents of certain types of illicit sexual behavior"
associated with any adult business in South Salt Lake.
3. I am aware of no complaints of masturbation or sexual
activity in any private or semi private areas run by my clients.
4. My clients do not encourage unlawful activities; nor do
they create unhealthy conditions.
There have never been any
complaints to the contrary.
5. It is ridiculous to suggest that customers come to our
business ufor the purpose of engaging in sex" . It is not allowed,
tolerated, or possible.
6.

See my previous comments about the spread of disease.

7.

See response to number 6.

8.

See response to number 6.

9.

See response to number 6.

10. See response to number 6.
11. See response to number 6.
12. See response to number 6.
13. See response to number 6.
14. See response to number 6.
15. My clients do not show "adult" films; and there have
never been complaints "that semen is found" in businesses operated
by my clients.
16.

See response to number 6.

17.

There are already reasonable regulations in effect.

18. There are already reasonable licensing procedures in
effect. There have never been any problems with them.
19. All areas accessible to customers are well monitored now.
Note that, in their fervor, the drafters of the new ordinance have
provided as follows:
5.56.210A.3. No private rooms, facilities or similar physical
arrangement may be located on the premises [to] which patrons
and/or employees have access. Restrooms are excluded from
this restriction (emphasis added).
Note that dressing rooms are not included. It appears that dressing
rooms will either have to be outfitted with toilets, or the
employees will have to dress in public. Either way, this makes
absolutely no sense.
20.

Reasonable licensing is in place.

21.

Reasonable licensing is in place.

22. The new ordinance deletes this requirement. The City has
obviously decided that it is not needed.

23.

This is already prohibited.

24.

This is already prohibited.

25. Since all of the questions relating to the "findings"
have been previously addressed by the ordinance; and because there
have not been problems associated with these businesses, it is
clear that "the general welfare, health, morals and safety of the
citizens of the City will not be promoted by the enactment of this
ordinance."
It has become fashionable to list a number of studies from
other jurisdictions, and claim that they show what will happen in
the local jurisdiction, if things are allowed to go on here. The
11th Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has recently ruled that a
City that has extensive experience with local adult businesses may
not ignore that experience and rely solely on the experiences of
other cities, as set forth in "studies" adopted by the City as
justification. The case in the 11th Circuit Court, Flanigan' s
Enterprises, Inc. v. Fulton County, Case No. 00-11152 (11th Cir.
2/20/2001), involved the City of Atlanta, which conducted a lengthy
study of its own, and found no correlation between dancers and
adverse secondary effects. This study by the City of Atlanta is the
most recent, most thorough, most scientific, and most objective of
any of the studies. The City of Atlanta, after spending much time
in obtaining the information, chose to ignore it, because it did
not fit their requirements. They were prohibited by the Court from
doing so. It is strongly suggested that a City with as much
experience with this type of business as South Salt Lake has, may
also not ignore local realities for "canned" studies provided by
acknowledged crusaders for "family values".
If any of you have further questions, please feel free to
contact me.
Sincerely yours,

W. Andrew McCullough

WAMrsck

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of September, 2002,1 mailed two true and correct

copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellants to Dave Carlson, 220 East Morris Ave., Salt
Lake City, UT 84115, and Scott Bergthold, 11000 North Scottsdale Rd. Suite 181, Scottsdale,
AZ 85254, attorneys for Defendant.
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